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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

and a part payment of a partnership debt by one partner will have the
same effect against the others as against the one who makes it.8
COSMAs B. YOUNG

Landlord and Tenant.
Lincoln Fireproof Warehouse Co. v. Gruesel, et. al.," was an action
by the Lincoln Fireproof Warehouse Company against Sylvester C.
Gruesel and others, trustees of the Home Wiring Company. The facts
are stated thus: on March 1, 1924, the plaintiff, a corporation, as lessor,
leased to a corporation known as the Home Wiring Company premises
in the City of Milwaukee known as No. 330-332 Third Street, for a
term of three years, in consideration of certain stipulated rentals per
annum, payable in monthly installments, in advance. After having
occupied the premises up to February 6, 1925, the Home Wiring Company executed an assignment in writing to the defendants, as trustees,
for the benefit of its creditors, of all its property, including its interest
in the said lease. The defendants paid the rentals becoming due
monthly, up to December 1, 1925; and some time between December
1 and December 11, 1925, the defendants abandoned and vacated the
demised premises, and refused to abide by the provisions of the lease.
Thereafter, the plaintiff took possession of the leased premises, and attempted to relet them in mitigation of damages, but without success.
Reargument was ordered in this case, because the appellant asserted
that the rule adopted in Selts Investment Co. v. Promoters,2 and Strauss
v. Lynch demanded a reconsideration of the facts presented. Those
cases declared it to be the duty of the landlord to take possession of
the premises abandoned by the tenant, and to use reasonable diligence
in reletting the same, in order to minimize damages. The former rule
set forth in a previous Wisconsin case4 held that by resuming possession
in order to perform his duty to the tenant, the landlord accepted surrender of the premises by the assignees, releasing them from further
liability to pay rent.
Justice Stevens in his opinion said the court concluded that this result presented no ground for a modification of the former decision.
While the assignees -were in privity of estate, they were obligated to pay
the rent as set forth in the lease. The original lessee was also liable,
because he had contracted to pay to the end of the term. The assignees
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NOTES AND COMMENT

made no such contract. Their liability ended when their privity of estate was terminated.
The assignees, however, had tendered possession by abandoning the
premises, and consequently such conduct constituted a surrender of
all the estate or interest which the assignees had in the lease-hold, "by
act of operation of law," as declared in section 240.06, Stats. 1927,
Burnham v. O'Grady.5
But where there is no privity of contract on the part of the assignees,
the landlord cannot create such liability by giving notice as he did in
this case, that he is taking possession for the single purpose of mitigating damages.
The rule that the landlord owes the duty to mitigate damages is not an
innovation in law. If this rule has been heretofore applied to other
forms of contract, there is no reason why it should not be applicable
to leases in real estate. In Poposkey v. Munkwitz,6 where the court was
determing the measure of damages sustained because of a breach of
a lease, the court aptly stated the rule in this manner: "Another rule
having its foundation in natural justice should here be stated. In any
case of a breach of contract, the party injured should use reasonable
diligence, and make all reasonable effort, to reduce to a minimum the
damages resulting from such breach."
The landlord made his contract with a tenant of his own selection.
Hence the tenant remained liable for the rent on the lease contract to
the end of the term, notwithstanding abandonment of the premises by
the assignees under an assignment for the benefit of creditors. In
fact, the assignees had given the landlord the benefit of having the rent
paid for some months after the tenant was in financial difficulties.
Note, however, the fact that the court has not determined whether
assignees to whom property is voluntarily transferred for the purpose
of liquidating the financial affairs of the tenant, which is stated in the
case of Liquidation of Citizens Trust Co.7
Other cases have held that in the event the landlord resumed possession of the abandoned premises and relets, or attempts to relet, them
on his own account, under such circumstances that it is fair to assume
that he does not intend to look to the tenant for the future rent or any
part thereof, he thus accepts the surrender and relieves the tenant from
his obligation."
But according to the better view, the reletting must be done by the
190 Wis. 461, 463; 63 N.W. 1049.
'68 Wis. 322; 32 N.W. 35, 39; 60 Am. Rep. 858.
" 171 Wis. 601.
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landlord upon notice to the tenant that that it is for he latter's benefit
and to minimize the damages, and that the landlord does not relinquish
his claim to the rent.9
*CARL F. ZEIDLER

Pleading: Joinder of Parties.
Ernest v. Schmidt, 227 N.W., Vol. 1, page 26 (advanced sheets).
The decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court on the rehearing of
Ernest v. Schmidt implies an interesting analysis of Sec. 263.04 of the
Wisconsin Statutes of 1927 which provides that all causes of action
stated in a complaint must effect all of the parties to the action. The
court reverses their edict on the first hearing of the same case, Ernest v.
Schmidt, 223 N.W. 558; but before dwelling on the reversal it would
be well to review the facts brought out in the first hearing.
The defendants were stockholders in The Elmwood Company, engaged in the development of certain land in Texas. The corporation
ran short of funds, and the defendants besought the plaintiff to lend
them money in order that they might continue the project. The agreement stated among other things that in consideration for such loan the
defendants would become individually liable for the amount of $11,500,
and that each of them would pay his pro rata share of $11,500 plus
interest if the plaintiff was forced to buy up the land to protect his
loan.
The defendants issued a trust deed on all their real estate to secure
$30,000 in notes. When these notes fell due, the defendants being unable to pay, the trustees foreclosed on their deeds and put the land up
for public sale. The plaintiff forced to bid in at the sale to protect
his loan, to which effect he notified the defendants. Receiving no reply
he organized a corporation to buy up the land, the plaintiff himself
becoming the owner of 233 Y of 500 shares of no par value capital
stock which represented an ownership in the land sufficient to cover
the loan made to the defendants. When the plaintiff offered the stock
certificates to the defendants, they refused to take them, and he sued
on the written agreement joining the subscribers as defendants. The
defendants demurred on the ground of sec. 263.04 "that the causes of
action in a complaint must effect all the parties," and that as the agreement created a several obligation, the plaintiff would have to proceed
against them separately. The Supreme Court at this time decided to
sustain the demurrer, explaining that due to the indefiniteness of the
complaint and the doubtful intent of the agreement, to allow a joinder of
parties would mean the emasculation of Sec. 263.04.
'Welcome v. Hess, 90 Cal. 507, 27 Pac. 369.
Higgins v. Street, 19 Okla. 45, 92 Pac. 153, 14 Ann. Gas. 1086.

